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THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE:

A

CRY FOR DECISIVENESS, CONSISTENCY, AND RESOLUTION

Jacobson v. United States
112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992)
Aubry Matt Pesnell
"The serpent beguiled me and I did eat."1
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of the entrapment defense, 2 judges and legal scholars have
waged a vehement theoretical battle within the criminal law jurisprudence. 3 This
discord was borne out of confusion over the theoretical basis of the entrapment

1. BoardofComm'rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864) (quoting Genesis 3:13).
2. The entrapment defense may be available when officers of the law employ deceptive techniques in an attempt to induce a person into the commission of a crime to increase the chances of a successful prosecution. According to the prevailing view, the entrapment defense is available when the intent to commit the crime originates
in the mind of the government official, and that government official implants the intent into the mind of an innocent person who would not have otherwise committed such an offense. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 237
U.S. 435, 441-43 (1932). Ifthe innocent person thereafter goes on to commit the crime, the person is completely
exonerated from all criminal culpability. See, e.g., Id. at 452. The rationale given by the Supreme Court for such
a defense is that the legislature in enacting criminal statutes did not intend to punish innocent people enticed by
police into the commission of a crime; rather, the legislature only intended to punish those who commit crimes
independent of substantial governmental influence. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
Under the generally accepted view, once the defense of entrapment is pleaded and a prima facie case is made
out, the burden of proof shifts to the government to prove that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime
before governmental involvement. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992) (citing
United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (holding that the government had failed to
prove that the defendant was predisposed to purchase child pornography through the mail before the government
enticed him to do so). The Court has held proof of a defendant's predisposition will in all cases preclude any allowance of the entrapment defense. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976).
There is, however, a diverging view that the entrapment defense should not consider whether the person is innocent but should focus on the overreaching methods employed to tempt the person to commit the crime. This
view sees the entrapment defense as a method of punishing law enforcement officials for their reprehensible conduct; and when their methods of law enforcement go too far, the defendant is set free to deter their continued use
of such methods. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
For an excellent review of the development of the entrapment defense from its earliest beginnings in English
common law through its implementation in the American criminal justice system, see Paul Marcus, The Development ofEntrapmentLaw, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 5 (1986).
3. This theoretical battle is evidenced by the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions written by the
Supreme Court concerning entrapment. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality again upholds the subjective test of entrapment as Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented, advocating the objective theory of the defense); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (majority holds true to the
subjective test while Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Douglas dissented); Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369 (1958) (majority supporting subjective standard with a four man concurrence that stood strong for the
objective theory); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (majority advocating the subjective approach
while the minority concurred supporting the objective standard).
For articles which chronicle the earliest beginnings of the entrapment controversy, see also J. Darwin Bond,
Note, Entrapment in Narcotic Law Violations, 20 Ky. L.J. 98 (1931-32); EntrapmentAs Defense In Prosecution
ForProhibitionViolation, 41 YALE L.J. 1249 (1932); Entrapmentby Government Officials, 28 COLUM. L. REv.
1067 (1928); Robert W. Hansen, Note, Entrapment In CriminalCases, 17 MARQ. L. REv. 218 (1932-33); Robert
M. Vandergrift, Note, CriminalLaw-Entrapment-Elementof Persuasion,8 S. CAL. L. REv. 245 (1935).
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defense which today has still not been fully resolved. 4 Many believe the defense is
a weapon for deterring the government from using overzealous investigation techniques and that the availability of the defense should depend solely on the law enforcement techniques employed in the investigation.' This view is the objective
approach of the entrapment defense. 6 Others contend that the purpose of entrapment is to protect innocent individuals who would not have committed a crime
without government inducement. They believe that allowing the defense depends
solely on whether the particular defendant would have committed the crime absent
police encouragement.' This view is the subjective theory of entrapment. 8
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of entrapment on six occasions9 and has each time re-affirmed the subjective theory of the defense, the
Court has failed to put a decisive end to this philosophical conflict by refusing to
discuss the underlying purpose of the defense and being unwilling to offer any rationale for their preference for the subjective approach over the objective theory.
Jacobsonv. United States1" represents the Court's latest attempt to resolve the entrapment debate. This decision may have put an end to the dispute over which theory of entrapment the Court will support, but the Court again failed to explain its

4. The Court in Jacobson v. United States used subjective theory analysis in both its majority and dissenting
opinions, which makes it doubtful that the objective approach of entrapment will ever emerge as an alternative to
the subjective theory of entrapment. However, the Court has still not unequivocally advocated the subjective approach in an unanimous opinion. See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992). See also Mathews v.
United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932).
A representative sample of states that have embraced the subjective theory of entrapment include: Colorado:
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-709 (West 1990); seealso People v. Sanchez, 580 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1978); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Michie 1992); see also Keaton v. State, 316 S.E.2d 452 (Ga. 1984); Illinois:
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/7-12 (Smith-Hurd 1993); see also People v. Barnes, 595 N.E.2d 40 (111. 1992);
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.066 (Vernon 1979); see also State v. Adams, 839 S.W.2d 740 (Mo. 1992);
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-213 (1991); see also State v. Farnsworth, 783 P.2d 1365 (Mont. 1989);
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-505 (1991); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A. 16.070 (West
1988); see also State v. Pleasant, 684 P.2d 761 (Wash. 1984).
5. This is the contention of those courts and legal scholars that advocate the objective theory of the entrapment defense. For views supporting the objective approach see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985).
A representative sample of states that support the objective approach include: Alaska: ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.81.450 (1992); see also McLaughlin v. State, 737 P.2d. 1361 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Arkansas: ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-209 (Michie 1987); see also Ridling v. State, 719 S.W.2d I (Ark. 1986); Florida: FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 777.201 (West 1992); see also Ricardo v. State, 591 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1991); Hawaii: HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 702-237 (1985); see also State v. Nakamura, 648 P.2d 183 (Haw. 1982); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-05-I1 (Supp. 1993); see also State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1978); Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 313 (1983); see also Commonwealth v. Ritter, 615 A.2d 442 (Pa. 1992); Texas: TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 8.06 (West 1974); see also Perez v. State, 816 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. 1991); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2303 (1990); see also State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
For a discussion of the objective approach to entrapment see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440-41
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
6. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440-41 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
7. An explanation of this approach can be found in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in United States v.
Russell,,411 U.S. 423 (1973).
8. Id.
9. See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988);
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
10. 112 S.Ct. 1535 (1992).
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preference of the subjective approach over the opposing objective theory.11 This
note contains a historical sketch which details the evolution of the entrapment defense and the two conflicting theories that the Supreme Court has developed. The
note will consider the underlying policies supporting the use of the subjective and
objective theories and will also suggest an alternate approach that reflects the practical application of the entrapment defense and utilizes both subjective as well as
objective considerations.
II. FACTS

AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February, 1984, Keith Jacobson, an elderly12 Nebraska farmer, ordered two
magazines from a California adult bookstore.13 These magazines were entitled
Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II and depicted nude teen and pre-teenage boys. 14
Shortly after the purchase, Congress passed the Child Protection Act of 1984
which contained a provision making it illegal to knowingly receive through the
mail any depiction of a minor child engaging in sexually explicit conduct.' 5 After
the passage of this legislation, law enforcement officials searched the California
bookstore where they found a mailing list which included the petitioner's name
along with a record of his purchase. 16 Government agents then began an investigation of Mr. Jacobson which lasted more than two and one-half years. 1
A government postal inspector first contacted Mr. Jacobson. 8 Through a fictitious organization, the American Hedonist Society, 9 the inspector mailed
Jacobson some information and enclosed an application for membership to the society.2" Jacobson joined the "organization" and filled out and returned its "sexual
attitude questionnaire."21

Investigations halted until May, 1986, when Mr. Jacobson received a solicitation from a fictitious research company which sought "response[s] from those who
'believe in the joys of sex and the complete awareness of those lusty and youthful
lads and lasses of the neophite [sic] age.' "22 To this solicitation Jacobson

11. Id.
12. Mr. Jacobson was 56 years old at the time of the purchase, and the record shows that he was in charge of
caring for his elderly father. Id. at 1537.
13. Id.
14. Id. These magazines did not depict the boys involved in any form of sexual activity, and at the time of the
purchase, were prohibited by neither Nebraska nor federal law.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988).
16. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1992).
17. Id.
18. This first contact came in January of 1985. Id.
19. The purported doctrine of the organization was "that members had the 'right to read what we desire, the
right to discuss similar interests with those who share our philosophy, and finally that we have a right to seek
pleasure without restriction being placed on us by outdated puritan morality.' Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The questionnaire requested that he rank his enjoyment of various sexual materials. Id. Jacobson indicated that he "enjoyed" (which was a 2 on a scale of 1to 4) pre-teen sex, but further stated that he was opposed to
pedophilia (an abnormal sexual attraction of an adult to children). Id.
22. Id.
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responded: "'Please feel free to send me more information, I am interested in teenage sexuality. Please keep my name confidential.' "23
Shortly thereafter, Jacobson was contacted by another government agent.24 The
agent posed as a lobbying organization, the "Heartland Institute for a New
Tomorrow [hereinafter HINT] .,25 Jacobson cooperated by responding to the enclosed questionnaire; to one of the questions he stated: "'Not only sexual expression but freedom of the press is under attack. We must be ever vigilant to counter
attack right wing fundamentalists who are determined to curtail our freedoms.' "26
HINT again contacted Jacobson and sent him a list of others who were active in the
organization. 27 Although he was urged to contact those on the list, Jacobson never
attempted any such communication.2 8 Despite this, a government officer began
writing to Mr. Jacobson under an assumed name.9 Mr. Jacobson responded to the
letters and expressed an interest in young homosexual intercourse, 3 but after two
letters, he ceased any further communication. 1
It was not until March, 1987, that the United States Customs Service became
involved in the investigation. 2 Through another "entity,"33 the Customs Service
sent Jacobson materials advertising photographs depicting young boys performing
sexual acts. 4 Jacobson placed an order for these materials, but his order was never

filled. 3
At the same time, the United States Postal Service was continuing its efforts and
contacted Jacobson again, this time under the guise of the" 'Far Eastern Trading
Company Ltd.' ,36 The communication suggested that Jacobson request further information if he was interested in pornography, which he did. 37 Later he received a
catalog from which he ordered a pornographic magazine containing photographs

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
The purpose of this group was "'an organization founded to protect and promote sexual freedom and freedom
of choice. We believe that arbitrarily imposed legislative sanctions restricting your sexual freedom should be rescinded through the legislative process.'" Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1539.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Mr. Jacobson defined "young" in his communications as" 'in their late teens and early 20's ... ' "Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The organization was purportedly a Canadian company known as Produit Outaouais. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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featuring young boys engaging in sexual activities.38 After a controlled delivery3 9
of the magazine, Jacobson was arrested. 4"
The police searched his home and found no pornographic materials other than
those Jacobson had purchased before the federal statute was enacted and those materials that the government agents had sent him during the course of the investigation.41 Jacobson was, thereafter, charged and indicted for violating 18 U.S.C
§ 2252(a)(2)(A). 2
The jury' found that Jacobson was not entrapped and convicted him of knowing receipt through the mails of sexually explicit material depicting a minor."
Jacobson appealed and obtained a reversal by a three judge panel of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals;4" however, upon petition of rehearing, the Eighth

38. Id. at 1539-40.
39. Commentator Cynthia Perez observed that "[d]uring a controlled delivery, after the suspect picks up the
'contraband' from his post office box, postal inspectors follow him and search his home pursuant to a previously
issued warrant." Cynthia Perez, Note, United States v. Jacobson: Are Child PornographyStings Creative Law
Enforcement or Entrapment?, 46 U. MiAMI L. REV. 235, 238 n.33 (1991) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 915
F.2d 521, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1990)).
40. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992).
41. Id.
42. Id. When Jacobson was indicted, the statute read:
(a) Any person who (1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or mails, any visual depiction,
if(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; or
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been transported or shipped in
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Any individual who violates this section shall be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both, but, if such individual has a prior conviction under this section, such individual shall be fined not more than $200,000, or imprisoned not less than five years nor more than 15
years, or both. Any organization which violates this section shall be fined not more than $250,000.
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp. V 1987).
43. The jury was instructed:
As mentioned, one of the issues in this case is whether the defendant was entrapped. If the defendant
was entrapped he must be found not guilty. The government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped.
If the defendant before contact with law-enforcement officers or their agents did not have any intent or
disposition to commit the crime charged and was induced or persuaded by law-enforcement officers o[r]
their agents to commit that crime, then he was entrapped. On the other hand, if the defendant before contact with law-enforcement officers or their agents did have an intent or disposition to commit the crime
charged, then he was not entrapped even though law-enforcement officers or their agents provided a favorable opportunity to commit the crime or made committing the crime easier or even participated in acts
essential to the crime.
Jacobson, 112 S. Ct., at 1540 n.1.
44. Id. at 1537. Jacobson was sentenced to 250 hours of community service work and was given two years
probation. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir.), rev'd, 916 E2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), revd,
112 S.Ct. 1535 (1992).
45. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir.), revd, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
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Circuit sitting en banc affirmed his conviction and concluded that he was not entrapped as a matter of law.46
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but the sole issue for consideration was
whether the government carried its burden of proving that Jacobson was predisposed to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2252 priorto the intervention of the postal inspectors
and other government officers.4 7 Justice White writing for the majority concluded
that "the prosecution failed, as a matter of law, to adduce evidence to support the
jury verdict that petitioner was predisposed, independent of the Government's
acts and beyond a reasonable doubt, to violate the law by receiving child pornography through the mails . . . ."' The circuit court's decision was, thus, reversed,
and Keith Jacobson's conviction was overturned. 49
HI.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

The defense of entrapment was not explicitly recognized until the early part of
the Twentieth Century." Before this time, however, the courts were sensitive to
reprehensible conduct by law enforcement officers, and this sensitivity was patently reflected in many opinions. Despite their overt disapproval of misguided
law enforcement techniques," some courts refused to allow the person who had
committed the crime to go free. " In an often quoted case, Board of Commissioners
v. Backus, 54 the New York Supreme Court exemplified this view:
Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in this case, the allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the plea as ancient as the
world, and first interposed in Paradise: "[tihe serpent beguiled me and I did eat."
That defense was overruled by the great Lawgiver, and whatever estimate we may
form, or whatever judgment pass upon the character or conduct of the tempter, this
plea has never since availed to shield crime or give indemnity to the culprit, and it is
safe to say that under any code of civilized, not to say christian ethics, itnever will. 55

The federal courts first recognized5 6 entrapment as a criminal defense in Woo
Wai v. United States. 7 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals justified the entrapment
46. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467,470 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
47. Jacobson, 112 S.Ct. at 1540-41 n.2.
48. Id. at 1543.
49. Id.
50. See infra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Love v. People, 43 N.E. 710 (I11.
1896); Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878) (Graves, J.,
concurring).
52. People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1904). There the Court of Appeals of New York stated: "[w]hile the
courts neither adopt nor approve the action of the officers, which they hold was unauthorized, still they should
not hesitate to punish the crime actually committed by the defendant." Id. at 791.
53. See, e.g., id.
54.29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (1864).
55. Id.
56. The earliest case that appeared in federal court was United States v. Wittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (C.C.E.D.
Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688). Although the court did not recognize that the entrapment defense was available and
disposed of the case by acquittal on other grounds, a concurring opinion by Judge Treat condemned entrapment
practices employed by the police. Wittier, 28 F. Cas. at 594 (Treat, J., concurring).
57. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
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defense because "a sound public policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality of those who' are thus induced to commit acts which infringe the letter of the
criminal statutes. "58
The Supreme Court did not render a decision on entrapment until 1932. In
Sorrells v. United States, 9 the Court attempted to establish uniformity in an area
that since Woo Wai6 had been surrounded with confusion.61
In Sorrells,62 a prohibition agent posing as a tourist visited the home of the defendant. 3 While there, the government agent asked the defendant on two occasions if he could obtain some liquor, and each time the defendant responded
negatively.64 After sharing common experiences about the World War, the agent
asked a third time for some liquor, to which the defendant finally acquiesced.65
The defendant was convicted of possessing and selling whiskey in violation of the
67
66
National Prohibition Act. He appealed, relying on the defense of entrapment.
The majority made it clear that the defense was not one grounded merely in
public policy ;68 rather, the Court established entrapment as a matter of legislative
intent:
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this
statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the
instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them. 69

58. Id. at 415. The court believed that Woo Wai's conviction of conspiracy to commit a criminal act could also
be reversed on alternate grounds. "[The law enforcement officers] intended to prevent the consummation of the
offense which they lured the defendants to undertake. Woo Wai and his associates, therefore,. . . were engaged
in an act which was not to result in an accomplished offense against the laws of the United States." Id. at 415.
59. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Although in deciding Sorrells the Court clearly recognized the existence of the entrapment defense, their attempt to settle the disputes and inconsistencies in the lower federal and state courts only
served to perpetuate the controversy as to the theoretical basis for the entrapment defense and the test by which
entrapment may be determined.
60. Woo Wai, 223 F. at 412.
61. Paul Marcus, The Development of Entrapment Law, 33 WAYNE L. Rav. 5, 13 n.42 (1986).
Most of the confusion surrounding the entrapment defense after Woo Wai centered on the proper theoretical grounding of the defense and the appropriateness of the defense under particular circumstances. Some
courts continued to reject the defense altogether, and the defense received occasional judicial criticism.
See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927).
Id.
62. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
63. Id. at 439.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 27 U.S.C. § 1 (1927) (repealed 1935).
67. Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1932). The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari but limited its review to the issue of whether the
evidence was sufficient to have the entrapment issue decided by a jury. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 438.
68. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448.
69. Id.
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The Court admitted that to deter criminal activity law enforcement could use
some deceptive and covert investigative methods.7" The Court noted, however,
that such methods cannot be tolerated when the criminal design originates in the
mind of the government official who implants that design in the mind of a person
and incites criminal activity in order to prosecute.71 In overturning Sorrells' conviction, the Court held that the trial judge was in error for refusing to submit the
entrapment issue to the jury.72 This predisposition test used by the majority in
Sorrells73 focused on the conduct of the defendant and has come to be known as the
"subjective" test of entrapment."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Roberts7" differed sharply with the majority's
theoretical basis for the defense.76 In his view, the defense was not based on legislative intent and should not inquire into the predisposition of the defendant.77 He
reasoned that in determining the availability of the defense, the focus should be on
the conduct of the government officials, not misdirected toward the predisposition
of the defendant.78 This concentration on the methods employed by the government to incite criminal activity79 is referred to as the "objective" test of entrapment.80

70. Id. at 441. The Court stated: "[ilt
is well settled that the fact that officers or employees of the government
merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises." Id. (citing Bates v. United
States, 10 F. 92, 94 (1881); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895); Goode v. United States, 159
U.S. 663,669 (1895); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 42 (1896); Andrews v. United States, 162 U. S. 420,
423 (1896); Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311, 315 (1897); United States v. Reisenweber, 288 F. 520, 526
(1923); Aultman v. United States, 289 F. 251 (1923)).
71.Id. at 442.
72. Id. at 451. The Court stated: "the controlling question [is] whether the defendant is a person otherwise
innocent whom the government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative
activity of its own officials." Id.
73. Id.
74. See Russell v. United States, 411 U.S. 423, 440 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
75. Justice Brandeis and Justice Stone joined in the concurrence. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-59 (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
76. Id.
77. He stated: "the true foundation of the doctrine [rests] in the public policy which protects the purity of government and its processes." Id. at 455.
78. Id. at 458-59.
He has committed the crime in question, but, by supposition, only because of instigation and inducement
by a government officer. To say that such conduct by an official of government is condoned and rendered
innocuous by the fact that the defendant had a bad reputation or had previously transgressed is wholly to
disregard the reason for refusing the processes of the court to consummate an abhorrent transaction ...
The accepted procedure, in effect, pivots conviction in such cases, not on the commission of the crime
charged, but on the prior reputation or some former act or acts of the defendant not mentioned in the
indictment.
Id. Justice Roberts also differed with the majority saying that the judge, not the jury, should decide the question
of entrapment. Id. at 458.
79. Russell v. United States, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
80. Id. Under the objective test, the availability of the entrapment defense is essentially determined by asking
whether the conduct of the law enforcement officials fell below an acceptable standard. Id.
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In Sherman v. United States,81 the Court implicitly reaffirmed Sorrells"2 and the
subjective test of entrapment. In Sherman the defendant met a government informant while they were both undergoing treatment for drug abuse. 83 Several subsequent meetings followed in which the two shared mutual experiences and
difficulties in overcoming their addiction to drugs.' Under the guise of experiencing withdrawal and not responding to his drug treatment, the informant asked the
defendant if he knew of a drug supplier.8 Initially the defendant attempted to avoid
the issue, but after repeated requests, he obtained a source and supplied the
86
drugs.
The Court found that Sherman had been entrapped as a matter of law.87 As it
had done in Sorrells,8 the Court theorized that the entrapment defense was a creature of legislative intent. 9 In determining whether the entrapment defense had
been established, the Court stated that a distinction must be made between law enforcement practices focusing on the "unwary innocent"" and those practices focusing on the "unwary criminal."91 The Court stated it would use the principles
established in Sorrells in making this determination.92 In Sorrells the Court stated
that the controlling question is "whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the
product of. . .its own officials."93 Sherman reaffirmed this principle. 4
Although the conviction of Sherman was overturned by unanimous decision,
the rationale for determining the entrapment defense was still divided, as evidenced by a concurring opinion9" which supported the objective test of

81. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
82. United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
83. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The record showed that the defendant on several occasions purchased the drugs for the informer and
used part of each purchase for his own consumption. On each occasion defendant bore the cost of that portion of
the drugs that he (defendant) used. Id.
87. Id. at 373.
88. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
89. "Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into
violations." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 373.
93. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
94. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 369.
95. Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan joined Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion. Sherman, 356
U.S. at 378-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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entrapment .96 Much of the concurrence focused on the vices of the majority opinion in Sorrells;97 however, Justice Frankfurter did direct the Court's attention to
the objective test and what he considered the crucial question: "whether the police
conduct revealed . . . falls below standards, to which common feelings respond,
for the proper use of governmental power. '' 98 He went further to say this inquiry is
to be determined on a case by case basis.99
In United States v. Russell,"'° the Court was faced with the issue of entrapment
when a government agent provided an essential ingredient in the manufacture of
illegal drugs."' The accused was charged with unlawfully manufacturing, processing, and delivering the drug methamphetamine." 2 In Russell, an undercover
federal narcotics agent told the accused he was interested in controlling the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamines throughout the Northeast." 3 The
officer offered to supply the accused with phenyl-2-propanone, a chemical which
is essential in the making of methamphetamine,104 and in exchange the officer was

96. Id. at 385.
This [objective] test shifts attention from the record and predisposition of the particular defendant to the
conduct of the police and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready and
willing to commit crime. It is as objective a test as the subject matter permits, and will give guidance in
regulating police conduct that is lacking when the reasonableness of police suspicions must be judged or
the criminal disposition of the defendant retrospectively appraised. It draws directly on the fundamental
intuition that led in the first instance to the outlawing of "entrapment" as a prosecutorial instrument. The
power of government is abused and directed to an end for which it was not constituted when employed to
promote rather than detect crime and to bring about the downfall of those who, left to themselves, might
well have obeyed the law. Human nature is weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without
government adding to them and generating crime.
What police conduct is to be condemned, because likely to induce those not otherwise ready and willing to commit crime, must be picked out from case to case as new situations arise involving different
crimes and new methods of detection.
Id. at 385.
97. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 435.
In Justice Frankfurter's view it is irrelevant to consider whether the intention of the accused arose in the mind of
the government official or the defendant. He asserts that there is no distinction between cases involving decoys
where the police simply provide the opportunity to commit a crime and cases whereby the police induce its commission. In both instances the intention is created in the mind of the government agent, yet in the decoy cases the
action has been undisputedly permissible despite the source of the intent. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Further, he reasoned that to utilize a predisposition test undermines what he considered to be the purpose of the
entrapment defense-to curtail the overreaching activities of law enforcement officials.
No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which
he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to
be tolerated by an advanced society. . . .Permissible police activity does not vary according to the particular defendant concerned; surely if two suspects have been solicited at the same time in the same manner, one should not go to jail simply because he. .. is said to have a criminal disposition.
Id. at 382-83.
98. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
99. See supra note 96.
100. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 424. Methamphetamine is commonly referred to as "speed." Id.
103. Id. at 425. All of the discussions as well as all of the manufacture of the methamphetamine took place in
Washington where the accused lived. Id.
104. Testimony at the trial indicated that although the chemical was difficult to obtain, it was not impossible.
Though the chemical is not illegal, the difficulty in obtaining it stems from a refusal of chemical suppliers to sell
the chemical at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Id. at 426-27.
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to receive half of all the drugs produced.1" 5 The accused conceded that he may
have been predisposed"' to commit the crime, but he contended that in view of the
officer's integral involvement in the crime, entrapment was established as a matter
of law." 7 He based this contention on a due process argument," 8 which is essentially the objective theory argument.
Although the Court did acknowledge that a situation may arise in which government action is so egregious that a due process argument would be persuasive to the
Court,0 9 it noted that the conduct of the government in this case was not of such
character. "0 Justice Rehnquist discussed the development of the subjective entrapment theory established in Sorrells and Sherman"' and implicitly reaffirmed them
stating that an individual's predisposition should be evaluated subjectively.' 12 Applying the subjective test, the Court found the accused predisposed to commit the
the accused in terms coined by the Sherman
crime." 3I Justice Rehnquist labeled
14
Court as an "unwary criminal."'
Although disputes surrounding the test to be used to establish the entrapment
defense had been apparent since the Court first addressed the issue in Sorrells, this
theoretical conflict had been waged through concurring opinions. "' In Russell,

105. Id. at 425.
almost four years and during
106. The defendant revealed to the officer that he had been making the drug for
that time had made approximately three pounds of the drug. Id.
107. Id. at 427.
108. Id. at 430.
The due process argument suggests that the involvement of the police officials is so great that prosecution for
any resulting crime would violate the due process guarantee of the Constitution.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a GrandJury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject forthe same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
public use, without just compensation.
be taken for
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
109. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (citing Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)).
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is
so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction, the instant case is distinctly not of that breed. . . .The law enforcement
conduct here stops far short of violating that "fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice," mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted).
110. Id.
111.Id. at 428-30.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 436.
Since the accused here conceded that the jury in the lower court could reasonably have found that he was predisposed to manufacture, process, and deliver methamphetamine and since the Court refused to recognize this
situation as one which demands acquittal on due process principles, the Court had little trouble in establishing
that he was indeed predisposed. Once predisposition is established and the defendant has committed the crime,
the defense of entrapment is no longer available to the accused. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 75-80 and 95-99.
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however, the dispute widened as Justices Stewart and Douglas advocated the objective approach in full blown dissents. 116
Dissenting in Russell, Justice Stewart strongly rejected the predisposition test
and the legislative intent upon which the Sorrells Court had based its decision:
Indeed, the very basis of the entrapment defense itself demands adherence to an approach that focuses on the conduct of the governmental agents, rather than on
whether the defendant was "predisposed" or "otherwise innocent." I find it impossible to believe that the purpose of the defense is to effectuate some unexpressed congressional intent to exclude from its criminal statutes persons who committed a
prohibited act, but would not have done so except for the Government's inducements. 117
In Justice Stewart's view, the entrapment defense cannot serve to protect the" 'otherwise innocent,' "118 but its purpose must be to deter unlawful government investigation activities. 19 In reaching this conclusion, he pointed out that the term
"predisposition" is misleading.120 He reasoned that by virtue of having violated the
statute, the accused is clearly not innocent of the crime, and though the precise
plan or scheme may not have been his own, he was "predisposed" in that he did ih
fact commit it.'21 Further, Justice Stewart reasoned that merely because government officials tempted the accused to commit the crime does not make the accused "more innocent or less predisposed" than if he had been tempted by a private
person' -" which, of course, would not entitle him to cry 'entrapment.'" 123 Since
the only difference between these two situations is the source of the temptation,
Justice Stewart concluded it was logical that "the significant focus must be on the
conduct of the government agents, and not on the predisposition of the defend124
ant."

116. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Russell, 411 U.S. at 439 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Brennan concurred with Justice Douglas' dissent, and Justices Marshall and Brennan joined in Justice
Stewart's dissent. Id.
Justice Douglas' dissent focused on the fact that the government officer had furnished the chemical to the accused which in his words "made the United States an active participant in the unlawful activity." Russell, 411
U.S. at 437 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
117. Russell, 411 U.S. at 441-42 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
118. Id. at 442.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
123. Russell, 411 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
124. Id.
Justice Stewart conceded as the concurring opinions in Sorrells and Sherman that some covert and deceptive
police conduct is necessary to deter crime. He articulated what constitutes entrapment:
When the agents' involvement in criminal activities goes beyond the mere offering of such an opportunity,
and when their conduct is of a kind that could induce or instigate the commission of a crime by one ready
and willing to commit it, then- regardless of the character or propensities of the particular person induced-I think entrapment has occurred.
Id. at 445.
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In Hampton v. United States, 115 a government informant not only supplied the
accused with heroin, but also arranged for the accused to sell the drugs to undercover drug enforcement officers.126 The accused did not contend that he was not
predisposed to sell drugs,127 but he sought to utilize the language in Russell128
where the Court had left the door open to a possible due process argument.129
In a plurality opinion,13 the Court denied that the government involvement
constituted a complete bar to any conviction as the accused had contended.131
Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the predisposition test but went on to limit the application of the due process argument that he, only three years earlier, had recognized.132 In interpreting Russell, Justice Rehnquist said the Court ruled out the
possibility of establishing the entrapment defense if the government proved the accused to be predisposed to commit the crime.133 Since the accused here had admit134
ted his predisposition, he could not avail himself of the entrapment defense.
The concurring opinion written by Justice Powell denied that a situation could
35
never arise that would bar a conviction in the face of defendant's predisposition.
Justice Powell emphasized that proof of predisposition would only in rare cases
not be dispositive, but he admitted that police overinvolvement in the crime would
"have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar convic1 36
tion."
The dissent again focused on the conduct exhibited by the government officials
and concluded that under the objective view the accused was entrapped as a matter

125. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
126. Id. at 485-86.
127. The testimony of the accused conflicted with that of the informant. Although the accused admitted to offering to sell and carrying out the sales in question, he denied knowing the substance that he sold was heroin. To
the extent that thejury found him guilty of the offense charged, thejury did not fully believe that he did not knowingly commit the crime. Id. at 487.
128. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
129. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489.
The jury instruction that the accused requested stated:
The defendant asserts that he was the victim of entrapment as to the crimes charged in the indictment.
If you find that the defendant's sales of narcotics were sales of narcotics supplied to him by an informer
in the employ of or acting on behalf of the government, then you must acquit the defendant because the
law as a matter of policy forbids his conviction in such a case.
Furthermore, under this particular defense, you need not consider the predisposition of the defendant
to commit the offense charged, because if the governmental involvement through its informer reached the
point that I have just defined in your own minds, then the predisposition of the defendant would not matter.
Id. at 487-88 (citation omitted).
130. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion with which Justice White and Chief Justice Burger joined. Id. at 485.
Justice Stevens (who on all prior occasions had joined the majority advocating the predisposition test) took no
part in the decision. Justice Powell concurred, with Justice Blackmun joining. Hampton, .425 U.S. at 491
(Powell, J., concurring). Brennan dissented with whom Justice Stewart and Justice Marshall joined. Hampton,
425 U.S. at 495 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-91.
132. Id. at 488-91.
133. Id. at 488-89.
134. Id. at 490.
135. Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 495 n.7.
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of law.137 The dissent distinguished this case from Russell, viewing the police conduct here as much more reprehensible:138 "The Government is doing nothing less
than buying9 contraband from itself through an intermediary and jailing the inter13
mediary."
The first distinguishing fact pointed out by the dissent was that in Russell only
legal chemicals were supplied to the accused -no contraband was involved.14 In
this case, however, the officials provided the accused with the same illegal substance he was convicted of selling."' Second, the defendant in Russell was involved in the manufacture of drugs before the governmental intervention, and his
illegal activity continued after the exit of the enforcement agent. 142 The dissent observed that in this case the "beginning and end of this crime. . . coincided exactly
with the Government's entry into and withdrawal from the criminal activity
"143

The dissent agreed with Justice Powell's concurring opinion in that predisposition does not preclude a bar to conviction on due process grounds.'4 Moreover,
the facts compelled a reversal even under the subJustice Brennan reasoned that
141
test.
predisposition
jective
In Mathews v. United States,1 " the Court determined whether a defendant in a
entitled
criminal prosecution who denied the essential elements of the crime1 was
47
to have the jury instructed on the affirmative defense of entrapment.
Fredrick Mathews was an official at the Small Business Administration [hereinafter SBA] and was accused of using his influence there to secure personal loans
from a businessman in exchange for help from the SBA.114 After his arrest, he denied that he had accepted a bribe and at the same time filed a motion in limine
requesting that he be allowed to plead entrapment.1 49 The district court denied his

137. Id. at 496-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. "Where the Government's agent deliberately sets up the accused by supplying him with contraband and
then bringing him to another agent as a potential purchaser, the Government's role has passed the point of toleration." Id. at 499 (citing United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975)).
139. Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973)).
In UnitedStates v. Bueno, the Fifth Circuit held that where the government has provided the defendant with the
contraband he is accused of selling, the entrapment defense is established as a matter of law. United States v.
Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir. 1971).
140. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 497-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 498.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 497.
145. Id.
146. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
147. Id. at 59.
148. Id. at 60-61.
The businessman, DeShazer, believed that he had been denied assistance from the SBA because of his refusal
to extend Mathews a loan. DeShazer contacted the FBI with his suspicions, and he joined in a sting operation
against Mathews. Thereafter, DeShazer offered to meet Mathews in a restaurant to make the loan of the money.
Mathews was then arrested. Id.
149. Id. at 61.
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motion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the decision."'
The Supreme .Court reversed, holding that, despite his denial of having committed the crime, the defendant was entitled to an entrapment instruction so long
as a reasonable jury could find that entrapment existed. s Although it did so in
dicta, the majority affirmed the accepted subjective test set forth in Sorrells5 2 and
stated that under this test the question of predisposition was one to be decided by
the jury."sa
In Mathews, the objective theory lost a great champion when Justice Brennan,
finally surrendered to the majority in a concurring opinion:
Were I judging on a clean slate, I would still be inclined to adopt the view that the
entrapment defense should focus exclusively on the Government's conduct. But I am
not writing on a clean slate; the Court has spoken definitively on this point. Therefore I bow
to stare decisis, and today join the judgment and reasoning of the
54
Court. 1

Although Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice
Blackmun joined, he did not speak to the conflict between the objective and subjective theory of entrapment, but confined himself to the issue of inconsistent defenses before the Court.155

150. Id. at 61-62.
The trial court denied the motion, saying that as a matter of law the defendant was not entitled to an entrapment
jury instruction because he would not admit to the commission of the essential elements of the crime.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision: When a defendant pleads entrapment, he is asserting that, although he had criminal intent, it was "the Government's deception [that implanted] the criminal design in the mind of the defendant." We find this to be inconsistent per se with the defense that the
defendant never had the requisite criminal intent. We see no reason to allow [petitioner] or any other defendant to plead these defenses simultaneously.
United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58
(1988) (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973)) (citation omitted) (second alteration
added).
151. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 61-62. The Court restated a basic rule: "As a general proposition a defendant is
entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable
jury to find in his favor." Id. at 63.
152. United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
153. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63 (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958)).
154. Mathews, 486 U.S. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring).
155. Justice White stated: "[Tlhe entrapment defense. . . 'is a relatively limited defense'; it is only available to
'a defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense.'" Mathews, 485 U.S. at 71 (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)).
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IV. INSTANT CASE

A. The Majority Opinion
The Court used Jacobsonv. United Statesl56 as its most recent forum to reaffirm
the subjective theory of the entrapment defense. Not only did the Court use predisposition terminology to resolve the issues presented in Jacobson, but it also implicitly reaffirmed the notion that had emerged in Sorrells that entrapment was indeed
a creature of legislative intent:
Like the Sorrells court, we are "unable to conclude that it was the intention of the
Congress in enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement
should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of
persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish
1 57

them."

Although the majority,158 under the pen of Justice White, chose to include a brief
discussion of the basis of the entrapment defense, the underlying theory of entrapment was not at issue in Jacobson.159 The sole issue presented was whether the government carried its burden of proving that Mr. Jacobson
was predisposed to
1 60
commit the crime before governmental intervention.
Justice White stated: "Where the Government has induced an individual to
break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue. . . the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the
criminal act priorto first being approached by government agents." 61
The majority pointed out that the sole piece of pre-investigation evidence that
the government presented was that Mr. Jacobson had ordered the Bare Boys magazines in 1984.162 From the majority's perspective, this offered little evidence of
predisposition to break the law, because at the time of the purchase, Mr. Jacobson
was acting within his rights under the law. 63 Justice White conceded that
Jacobson's prior purchase might be probative of the defendant's sexual inclinations
to view pornographic materials or to otherwise "act within a broad range, not all of
which is criminal," but he was quick to establish that this alone is not enough to

156. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
157. Id. at 1543 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932)).
158. Joining Justice White in the majority opinion were Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Thomas. Id.
at 1537.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1540 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
Justice White pointed out in a footnote that it is well settled that predisposition of the defendant must be shown
to have existed prior to contact with government officers. Furthermore he stated that this idea is so firmly rooted
in the case law that "the Government conceded the point at oral argument." Id. at 1540-41 n.2.
162. Id.at 1541.
163. Id.
Although Jacobson purchased the magazines in February of 1984, the federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 2252 did not
become law until May of 1984, and Nebraska did not make receipt of child pornography illegal until the enactment ofNEa. REV. STAT. § 28-813.01 in 1989. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541-42.
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show predisposition to do what had now become illegal: "[T]here is a common
un' 164
derstanding that most people obey the law even when they disapprove of it."
The majority went further to say that even evidence gathered during the investigation but prior to the criminal act was not sufficient to establish the defendant's
predisposition. 16 His willingness to respond to the investigator's solicitations and
surveys was merely indicative of his personal sexual preferences and inclinations
to support private lobbying efforts. 166 The Court again explained its decision pointing out that any willingness to receive sexually explicit materials involving minors
came only after "the Government had devoted 2 l/2 years to convincing him that he
had or should have the right to engage in the very behavior proscribed by law."167
Finally, in reversing the lower court's decision, Justice White wrote: "Rational jurors could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner possessed the requisite predisposition prior to the Government's investigation and that it existed
independent of the Government's many and varied approaches to [the defendant] ."168

B. The Dissenting Opinion
dissent169

The
in Jacobson did not differ from the majority on which theory of
entrapment should be used in disposing of the case;170 it was content to analyze the
facts surrounding Jacobson using the subjective approach of entrapment.17 1 The
dissent's dispute with the majority was concentrated in two central areas.172 First,
it believed that the government had met its burden of proving that Mr. Jacobson
was predisposed to commit the crime and that a reasonable jury could have found
that he was predisposed to receive child pornography.173 Second, the minority
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1542.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1543.
Much of the Court's discussion consisted of examples of the governmental conduct in which the fictitious organizations that contacted Mr. Jacobson purported to be lobbying entities which derived their financial resources
from catalogue sales. Other examples of the conduct included a reference to contacts from the Customs Service
where they claimed to be an international organization opposing all censorship. This organization promised the
defendant that any mailings from the organization to him could not be opened by police officers for inspection
without a judicial order and implied that the defendant should be allowed to order and enjoy such publications
free of censorship. Id. at 1542-43.
168. Id. at 1543.
169. The dissenters included Justice O'Connor, who wrote the opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Kennedy and Scalia. Justice Scalia, however, did not join in Part II of the dissent which concerned the minority's
opinion that the majority had redefined the meaning of predisposition. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1535 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Justice O'Connor supported the jury's conclusion saying:
It was . . . the jury's task, as the conscience of the community, to decide whether or not Mr. Jacobson
was a willing participant in the criminal activity here or an innocent dupe. The jury is the traditional "defense against arbitrary law enforcement.". . . There is no dispute that the jury in this case was fully and
accurately instructed on the law of entrapment, and nonetheless found Mr. Jacobson guilty. Because I believe there was sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's verdict, I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 1547 (citations omitted).
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believed that in its analysis the majority had improperly redefined "predisposition."174
The dissenters believed that Mr. Jacobson was predisposed to receive child pornography through the mail.175 Central to this argument was evidence of the defendant's ready compliance with the solicitations of the government. 178 Justice
O'Connor, author of the dissent, contended that the determination of predisposition should be made when the defendant was offered an opportunity to commit the
crime, not at the time government officials first came on the scene.177 The dissent,
thus, considered Jacobson's ready compliance as convincing evidence of his predisposition to perform the criminal act.178 Further the dissent failed to see the
"substantial pressure" exerted on Jacobson to which the majority had shown so
much sympathy.179 The dissent pointed out that no agent ever approached Jacobson
face-to-face, 180 and the letters and solicitations could have been "ignored or
181
thrown away."
The dissenters saw the rule set out by the majority -that preliminary governmental conduct can create predisposition -as too vague a standard and expressed
concern that this standard might be misapplied by lower courts.182 The dissent
pointed out that the Court's opinion might be read to prohibit the police from baiting criminals as part of a sting operation "for fear of creating a predisposition in its
suspects.""~ Justice O'Connor found it even more disturbing that the majority
failed to "distinguish between Government conduct that merely highlights the
temptation of the crime itself, and Government conduct that threatens, coerces, or
leads a suspect to commit a crime in order to fulfill some other obligation."'8
Further, the dissent believed that the majority's method of analysis had redefimed predisposition.18 Since the majority had conceded that the defendant had a
predisposition to view child pornography, the inquiry should have ended. The majority, however, held that this evidence did not support the inference that he would

174. Id. at 1546-47.
175. Id. at 1543.
176. Justice O'Connor points out that Mr. Jacobson was only offered two opportunities to purchase child pornography from government agents, and on both occasions he ordered. Id. at 1543.
177. The minority bases this contention on the finding in Sherman where the Court decided that a defendant
was not predisposed based on "the Government's numerous unsuccessful attempts to induce the crime ....
Id.
at 1544 (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-76 (1958)).
The majority contended that the issue of predisposition had to be established prior to the first contact with government agents; consequently, it determined that when the first opportunity to buy the illegal materials was afforded to Mr. Jacobson, the prior government contacts had created the disposition to buy those materials so his
compliance was not indicative of his predisposition before the government intervention. Id. at 1541.
178. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1544 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1545.
180. Id.at 1543.
181. Id.at 1545.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1546.
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commit a crime.' 88 The dissenters saw this as a new requirement for establishing
predisposition:
Not only must the Government show that a defendant was predisposed to engage in
the illegal conduct, here, receiving photographs of minors engaged in sex, but also
that the defendant was predisposed to break the law knowingly in order to do so. The
statute violated here, however, does not require proof of specific intent to break the
law; it requires only knowing receipt of visual depictions produced by using minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. . . . Under the Court's analysis, however, the
Government must prove more to show predisposition than it need prove in order to
convict.187
V. ANALYSIS

In view of the support proponents have given the two divergent theories of the
entrapment defense, it is curious to note that the subjective and objective theories
of entrapment have drawn their existence from sources which are not as incompatible as the dissenters in Russell would contend. 1" The subjective approach was
born as a matter of legislative intent, while the objective approach was distinguished as being founded on public policy. It is not difficult to find congruence between these two bases. Normally the intent of the legislative enactment is
fundamentally grounded in the policies which our society deems important. It follows that showing deference to the subjective approach to entrapment over the objective approach, or vice versa, cannot be justified without a thoughtful
contemplation of the policies promoted by each respective theory. In light of this,
it is appropriate to analyze the two theories that have given the Court and legal
commentators such a grand forum for dispute. Such analysis should not be based
merely on conjecture, political ideology, or stare decisis, but instead on the policies that underlie each theory.
A. Purposes
The purpose of the entrapment defense, when considered from the subjective
approach, seeks to protect those individuals who are "otherwise innocent" and
would not have committed the crime but for the inducement of intervening government officials.189 If this is the purpose of entrapment, then it is appropriate to
have the availability of the defense focus on the accused and whether he or she is in
fact "otherwise innocent." Only through a subjective assessment of the accused's
innocence can such an inquiry be made.
Justice Roberts, concurring in Sorrells, believed the purpose of the entrapment
doctrine was to protect "the purity of government and its processes."19'

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See generaly United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 324 (1973).
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932).
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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Accordingly, the purpose of the objective approach is grounded in the need for the
Court to sustain the sanctity of the criminal justice system by punishing the overreaching conduct of law enforcement and thereby deterring their use of overzealous methods. In achieving such a purpose, it is irrelevant to inquire into the
accused's predisposition; therefore, the focus of the defense should rest strictly on
"whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards,
91
to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power.'
B. Supporting the Focus of the Subjective Approach
Perhaps the most fundamental policy underlying the subjective approach is
grounded in the substantive criminal law. Generally the purpose of criminal law is
to insist that individuals conform their behavior to that which society considers to
be desirable and to punish those that run afoul of those societal standards.' 9 2 Regarding crimes that require intent as an essential element, the criminal justice system seeks only to punish those who act with a guilty mind.' The courts,
therefore, must consider the mental state of the accused, using a subjective standard, to determine whether a particular defendant
had the necessary criminal intent
1 94
to commit the crime for which he is accused.
It logically follows that any defense that would seem to negate or lessen the requisite mens real95 would also be evaluated by a subjective standard. This seems to
be a reasonable basis on which to rest the subjective approach to entrapment. In
Russell, the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is only when the Government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play."' 96 From this it can be inferred that the Court
treats entrapment as a mens rea defense whereby the origin of the intent serves as
an excusing factor which reduces the degree of the criminal intent to a level of nonculpability.
According to the Court, the origin of the intent is the factor that may allow the
defendant to escape prosecution.' If the intent originates in the mind of the accused and he thereafter proceeds to commit the crime, the Court focusing on his
subjective intent will not allow the entrapment defense. Since he had subjective
evil intent, the wrongdoer will be punished. By denying the defense and punishing
the accused for his mens rea, the Court remains true to the tenets of criminal law.

191. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
192. United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978).
193. The law has chosen only to punish offenders when commission of the proscribed act is accompanied by
the concurrent mens rea. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4 (2d ed. 1986).
194. Those crimes that require intent as an element are called malum in se crimes (those which are wrong in
and of themselves or are inherently evil, as opposed to malum in prohibitum crimes which are wrong because
they are prohibited by legislation and require no criminal intent). See State v. Horton, 51 S.E. 945, 946 (N.C.
1905) (defining and distinguishing between malum in se and malum in prohibitum crimes).
195. Mens rea literally translated means guilty mind. United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3d Cir.
1943).
196. Russell v.United States,
411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
197. Id.
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Alternatively, if the criminal intent originates with the police and they implant
the criminal intent in the defendant's mind, the subjective approach to the entrapment defense views the criminal's mens rea as less detestable than that of an accused who commits a crime without government inducement. Professor Roscoe
Pound has stated that " '[o]ur traditional criminal law thinks of the offender as a
free moral agent who, having before him the choice whether to do right or wrong,
intentionally chose to do wrong."' 198 When using the subjective approach, the belief must be that since the government implanted the criminal intent in the defendant's mind, the accused ceases to be a "free moral agent" and can no longer freely
choose to commit or not commit the crime. This lack of freedom, in the eyes of
the criminal tradition, reduces the defendant's criminal culpability.
An analogous theory in criminal law is the rule of provocation.199 Under this
theory, the criminal law views a defendant who has killed another human being,
with the specific intent to do so, as less guilty if he can show that he killed with
adequate provocation.20 0 The rule of provocation also requires that the killing be
done "in the heat of passion."2 1 If a defendant is overtaken with such violent emotion and has no time to cool before acting, he is no longer able to act as a free moral
agent.20 2 Instead, the "heat of passion" that the defendant experienced, when he
had no time to contemplate his actions, deprived him of his will to act as society
desires.3 In the eyes of the law, such a defendant's mens rea is not that of murder.2" 4 In light of the mitigating circumstances -the provocation-he will be
205
charged with the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.
When considering whether the rule of provocation is available, a court must
first determine whether a reasonable person in the same situation would have

198. Harry G. Anderson, Comment, Some Aspects of the Law ofEntrapment, 11 BROOK. L. REV. 187 (1941)
(quoting ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 583-89 (1922)).
Professor Pound is regarded as one of the preeminent scholars of jurisprudence. He served as Dean of the
Harvard School of Law and was an accomplished trial lawyer, judge, and teacher. Professor Pound held honorary
degrees from over seventeen institutions. For a detailed account of his life and accomplishments, see Mary Fisk
Docksai, Roscoe Pound, TRIAL, July, 1980, at 44.
199. For an extensive overview of the rule of provocation doctrine and policies concerning the defense see
Adrian Briggs, In Defence of Manslaughter, 1983 CRIM. L. REV.764 (1983); William H. Coldiron, Historical
Development of Manslaughter,38 Ky. L.J. 527 (1949-50); Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the
Reasonable Man Obsolete? A CriticalPerspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REV.435
(1981); Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat Of Passion:A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982); Manslaughterand the Adequacy of Provocation:The Reasonablenessof the Reasonable
Man, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 1021 (1958); John R. Snowden, The Casefor a Doctrineof Provocationin Nebraska, 61
NEB. L. REv. 565 (1982); Jack K. Weber, Some Provoking Aspects of Voluntary ManslaughterLaw, 10 ANGLOAm. L. REV. 159 (1981); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-Of-Passion
Manslaughterand Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1679 (1986).
200. See supra note 198.
201. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1, at 98 (3d ed. 1982).
Passion has been defined as "violent, intense, high-wrought, or enthusiastic emotion." People v. Borchers, 325
P.2d 97, 102 (Cal. 1958) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2d ed. 1934).

202. Manslaughterandthe Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonablenessofthe ReasonableMan, 106 U. PA. L.
REV. 1021, 1022 (1958).
203. Id.
204. Id. See generally ROLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1, at 84-104 (3d ed. 1982).
205. Id.
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acted out of passion rather than in the way that society would have him act. 20 6 Second, the focus is placed directly on the defendant to determine if he was under such
extreme heat of passion that he could no longer freely choose not to commit the
crime.2°7 The mens rea defense of the rule of provocation seeks to discern whether
there was evil intent and whether the freedom to resist acting on that intent was
hindered. 20 1 If a restriction of free will is found, then the defendant's anti-social
behavior is seen as less offensive, and his lessened ability to act freely serves as a
mitigating factor which reduces his degree of responsibility for the crime.209
Similarly, it can be said that the entrapment defense should focus on the freedom of will of the defendant, just as Sorrells and its progeny have held.210 In substantiating the subjective approach of entrapment, the Supreme Court has never
made such an analogy to the rule of provocation nor has it ever expressly classified
entrapment as a mens rea defense.2 1 When the question of entrapment arises,
however, such a comparison provides us with a reasonable justification for focusing on the mental state of the defendant and the origin of any evil intent rather than
the actions of governmental officials. When the justification for the entrapment
defense is considered along with the general purpose of criminal law, the subjective theory is consistent if the availability of the defense depends on whether the
accused had evil intent and from where that intent originated.
When determining the availability of the entrapment defense, the subjective approach provides a method of accurately assessing a person's criminal intent; however, allowing the defense reveals a flaw in its consistency. In order to be wholly
consistent with the principles of criminal law and other mens rea defenses, the entrapment defense should act to lessen or mitigate the defendant's criminal culpability but should not totally excuse him from his wrong.

206. Manslaughterandthe Adequacy ofProvocation:The Reasonableness ofthe ReasonableMan, 106 U. PA. L.
REV. 1021, 1022 (1958).
207. Id.
208. See Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion:A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CIuM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421,442 (1982).

209. Id.
210. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988);
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); see supra part III.
211. Although the Court has never classified entrapment as a malum in se defense, Chief Justice Hughes in
Sorrells opined: "The defense is available, not in the view that the accused though guilty may go free, but that the
Government cannot be permitted to contend that he is guilty of a crime where the government officials are the
instigators of his conduct." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
Justice Roberts concurring in Sorrells alluded that under the subjective approach entrapment may be a mens rea
defense. In advocating the objective theory he stated:
This view calls for no distinction between crimes malum in se and statutory offenses of lesser gravity;
requires no statutory construction, and attributes no merit to a guilty defendant; but frankly recognizes
the true foundation of the doctrine in the public policy which protects the purity of government and its
processes.
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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A total defense, such as insanity, excuses the actor from all criminal responsibility because the courts reason that the defendant has no criminal intent. 212 With
entrapment, however, it cannot be said that the defendant was totally void of the
required mens rea. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Russell, observed that the defendant's having committed the crime shows conclusively that the defendant is not
totally innocent.2"' Although the criminal intent may have been implanted in his
mind and his ability to act as a free moral agent may have been impaired, the defendant has not been deprived of all ability to choose. In view of this, it would be a
mistake to allow the guilty defendant to go free.
If entrapment is to be treated as a mens rea defense and is to be consistent with
the underlying principles of criminal law, the law must see the origin of the intent
as a mitigating circumstance that merely reduces the defendant's mens rea to a
lower level of criminal culpability rather than an excusing factor that relieves him
of all responsibility for the crime.
C. Supporting the Focus of the Objective Approach
Advocates of the objective theory of entrapment have been more forthcoming
with policy to validate the use of the objective theory. The proponents of the objective approach contend that the purpose of the entrapment defense is not to protect
the unwary innocent, but rather it is to protect the "purity of government and its
processes.'214
Because the purpose of the defense is to control impermissible police conduct, "it is
wholly irrelevant to ask if the 'intention' to commit the crime originated with the defendant or government officers, or if the criminal conduct was the product of 'the
creative activity' of law-enforcement officials."
...
If the purpose of the defense of entrapment is to be achieved, the test must be
objective and focus only on the methods used.215
If the primary purpose of the entrapment defense is to deter the overreaching
methods used by governmental agents, then the objective approach is undoubtedly
preferable to the subjective approach. By focusing solely on the actions of law enforcement officials, those methods considered to be reprehensible by society and
detrimental to the courts and the criminal justice system can be effectively assessed without regard to the propensity of a certain defendant to commit a crime.

212. Under the Model PenalCode when the insanity defense is granted, the defendant is not guilty of the crime
because he does not have the capacity to prevent himself from committing it and is thereby unable to conform his
conduct to what the law requires. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTIN W. ScorT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 36, at 269

(1972).
213. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 117-24
and accompanying text.
214. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, J., concurring).
215. People v. Moran, 463 P.2d 763, 768-69 (Cal. 1970) (citations omitted) (quoting Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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An underlying policy furthered by the objective approach is that all people are
considered equal under the law. Following the objective theory of entrapment,
"[p]ermissible police activity does not vary according to the particular defendant
concerned. '216 To accomplish the "goal" of the entrapment defense-deterring
overzealous police methods - equal treatment under the law is essential. If the entrapment defense were only available to those persons who were considered innocent, then the full deterrent effect of allowing such a defense would be thwarted.21 7
Government officials would feel free to employ any method regardless of how reprehensible to tempt, apprehend, and convict those persons such as habitual offenders who would be seen as predisposed. The application of an objective standard,
one that focuses only on the actions of the government officials, would effectively
prevent such inequity and would ensure that all are treated equally before the law.
Proponents of the objective approach have offered a compelling argument by
analyzing the innocent person exception to the entrapment defense.2 8 Justice
Stewart first made this argument inUnited States v. Russell.2 19 This exception provides that if the inducement to commit the crime comes from a private individual
who has no connection with law enforcement, the defendant cannot claim entrapment.220 In supporting the focus of the objective approach, Justice Stewart and
other objective view proponents have pointed out that if a law enforcement agent
engages in the same techniques as those used by a private person, then the entrapment defense is available to the defendant. 22' The only difference between the two
situations is the source of the inducement. Where the entrapment defense is allowed, the source of the inducement emanates from the government official.222
Therefore, it must follow that the focus in determining the availability of the enenforcement officials and
trapment defense must fall on the activities of the2law
23
not on the subjective propensities of the defendant.
It can also be said that the objective view of the entrapment defense is consistent
with the underlying policies of the criminal law jurisprudence. By focusing on the
methods used by law enforcement officers and punishing them for overzealous police tactics, the objective approach deters the police from conduct that is seen as
intolerable by society, and thereby furthers the aim of the criminal law.224 It must
be recognized, however, that the exoneration of the defendant in order to punish
law enforcement is a high price to pay for its misconduct. Not only must this cost

216. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
Justice Frankfurter continued: "[S]urely if two suspects have been solicited at the same time in the same manner, one should not go to jail simply because he has been convicted before and is said to have a criminal disposition." Id.
217. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985).
218. Russell, 411 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
219. Id. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
220. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
221. Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985).
222. Id.
223. Russell, 411 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
224. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985).
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be borne by law enforcement officials, but society bears the cost of having a guilty
individual become immune to prosecution for his wrongdoing.22
D. Is Subjective PreferenceReally Preferred?
Although both the subjective and the objective approaches to the entrapment
defense are effective in promoting their respective goals, the Court has chosen to
prefer one to the total exclusion of the other. Since the Court has consistently favored the subjective theory of entrapment, it must believe that the purpose of the
entrapment defense is to protect those who are innocent and in whom the police
have implanted criminal intent.
After Jacobson,22 the support for the subjective approach seems unquestionable. 227 Although the explanation needed in this area is still absent from the Court's
opinions, the subjective focus of the defense can achieve the purpose not only of
the entrapment defense but also the goals of the criminal law.22
This consistency with the underlying tenets of the criminal law jurisprudence is
the single distinguishing factor that makes the subjective theory of entrapment
preferable to the objective approach. Although flawed in that it totally excuses the
defendant's crime instead of merely mitigating it, the Court's treatment of entrapment as if it were a mens rea defense parallels the goals of criminal law by seeking
to punish only those who act as free moral agents with the requisite evil intent.
In following the subjective theory of entrapment, there will be a substantial deterrent effect to police in their utilization of detestable methods of law enforcement. Government officials will no doubt be conscious that the subject of their
investigation may be set free if they employ unconscionable law enforcement techniques. This by-product of the subjective approach serves as little consolation to
advocates of the objective theory who believe that any benefit achieved serves as a
mockery to the full deterrent effect that the objective theory could provide.
Despite differences in judicial ideology on the issue of entrapment and the preference for the subjective approach, it cannot be disputed that the Court is moved
by audacious activities of government officials when employed to ensnare "helpless" defendants. It is impossible to imagine a court having such a strict view of the
subjective entrapment theory that it would render an opinion without being motivated by the overzealous conduct of law enforcement officials. From a practical

225. Some states believe that if the crime is especially heinous, the cost of allowing the defendant to go free is
too great to be borne by society. These jurisdictions will not allow the entrapment defense to intervene and exonerate the defendant who has committed an extraordinarily heinous crime. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTiN W.
SCcTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(a), at 421-22 (2d ed. 1986) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985)).
226. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1535 (1992).
227. See infra section V.E.
228. See supra text accompanying note 193.
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standpoint, the Court considers both the predisposition of the defendant as well as
the investigation techniques employed by the police.229
If the Court is motivated by subjective and objective theory considerations,
then it is important to reflect that in the test used when availing the entrapment defense. It is essential that the Court adopts a test that accurately reflects all factors subjective and objective -that prompt the defense's availability. Without this, the
Court will never end the subjective-objective conflict, nor will the Court ever be
successful in effectively leading the lower courts in resolving entrapment issues.
E. EntrapmentAfter Jacobson
In the wake of the Jacobsondecision there can be little dispute as to which view
of the entrapment defense the Supreme Court now supports.23" Both the five
Justice majority as well as the dissent analyzed the factual circumstances using the
subjective approach of entrapment by determining the defendant's predisposition
to commit the crime.231 The dispute between the majority and the dissenters did
not concern whether to follow the objective or subjective approach, rather it centered almost exclusively around whether Mr. Jacobson was predisposed to commit
the crime and when the predisposition of the defendant should have been assessed.232
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Mathews v. United States233 dealt a blow
to those who saw the objective approach as the modern trend of the entrapment
defense. 234 There he deviated from his staunch position in the objective theory
camp and bowed to stare decisis to align himself with the champions of the subjective theory. If there was any hope that the objective approach to the entrapment
defense would emerge again as a viable alternative theory, it seems that Jacobson
has left no doubt as to its defeat. The lone allusion to the objective theory in
Jacobsoncame in Justice O'Connor's dissent to which she immediately tied subjective terminology:
The crux of the Court's concern in this case is that the Government went too far
and "abused" the "processes of detection and enforcement" by luring an innocentperson to violate the law. Consequently, the Court holds that the Government failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jacobson was predisposedto commit the
crime. 235

229. Just one patent example was chronicled in Sherman when the Court was motivated by the number of requests made by the government agent and the manner in which he was able to obtain capitulation; the Court also
seemed to be moved by the fact that the government induced a reforming drug addict to return to his drug habit.
The Court stated: "[The government agent] not only procured a source of narcotics but apparently also induced
petitioner to return to the [drug] habit." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958).
230. See generallyJacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1535.
231. Id. See also supra parts I., IV.
232. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1543-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
233. 485 U.S. 58, 66 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
234. Paul Marcus, The Development ofEntrapmentLaw, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 18 (1986).
235. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1547 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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E Proposal:A Two-Step Analysis
A cursory inspection of the five-to-four majority in Jacobson may seem to suggest a narrow defeat of the proponents of the objective test and continued struggles
on the Court concerning the entrapment theory; however, a closer examination
reveals a decisive victory for the predisposition test and the subjective theorists .236
The controversy over which test of entrapment should be used may at this point be
moot, but there are still underlying theoretical questions that the Jacobson decision did not resolve. Although it can be deduced from the majority opinions 237 that
the purpose of the entrapment defense is to protect the individual who is not predisposed to commit a crime, the Court's majority opinions have patently avoided
any discussion of why the subjective approach of entrapment is so preferable to the
objective test that it should preclude any integration of the two approaches.
Regardless of which theory of entrapment the Court or legal commentators
choose to support, both the subjective and the objective theories further valid
goals. 238 It is essential to realize that the practical utilization of one approach is not
mutually exclusive of the other - a pawn that neither objective nor subjective theorists have been willing to concede.
Such concessions in this doctrinal conflict call for a novel approach to entrapment, one which accurately reflects all factors that should be assessed when determining the availability of the defense. A two-step analysis requiring both objective
and subjective inquiries 13 could accomplish the aims of both the objective and
subjective camps. 24 This analysis would allow the Supreme Court to guide lower
courts' decisions by using a test that resembles a practical evaluation of an entrapment issue.
First, the Court should objectively assess the police conduct and the methods
which the police employed. Such an investigation should center around whether
the police conduct is, in the words of the Court, of the type that "falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of government
power" 24 1 or of the type that would tend to compromise the integrity of any government condoning such methodology. The defendant should have the burden of

236. See supra section V.E.
237. SeeJacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1535-43; Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 58-66 (1988); Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484,484-91 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,423-36 (1973); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 369-78 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 435-42 (1932).
238. See supra section V.A.
239. Such a test has been recognized by Dean Paul Marcus as what he calls the hybrid test. In his article, he
recognized that several states have either by statute or by judicial interpretation adopted a test that utilizes both
objective and subjective standards in order to determine the availability of the entrapment defense to the accused.
Paul Marcus, The Development of EntrapmentLaw, 33 WAYNE L. REv.5, 34 (1986).
240. See supra part V.A.
241. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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showing242 that the questionable police conduct would have caused a reasonable
person to commit the same crime. 2"
Second, a subjective investigation should be made into whether the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime. A court must inquire into the defendant's
past and present specific acts in order to assess the accused's propensity to commit
the crime.'" In order to benefit from the entrapment defense the accused must
prove that he was not predisposed to commit the crime and that the government
conduct caused him to commit the crime for which he is charged.24 Further, the
defendant must prove that not only did the police conduct induce him to commit
the crime, but that such police methods would have induced any reasonable person to act similarly.
Once the defense has established both the objective and the subjective parts of
the two-step analysis, the entrapment defense should be available to the defendant.
By requiring a two-part standard for the defense, the sanctity of the government
and its processes is protected, and police are deterred from using overzealous
methods. At the same time, the individual who is not predisposed to commit a
crime, absent egregious police activity, is protected from criminal prosecution.
Recognizing the reality of how the Court resolves entrapment controversies -the
Court's being moved by both objective and subjective considerations -this type of
analysis would provide the criminal law with a practical standard by which all entrapment decisions could be governed. Such a standard would also provide the jurisprudence with a decisive resolution to a doctrinal conflict that has raged for
over three-quarters of a century. 2

242. This allocation of the burden of persuasion is wholly constitutional. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977) (holding that placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant to establish an affirmative defense does not violate the Due Process Clause).
Although it may be argued that placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant implicates the violation of due
process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the United States Supreme Court has held
that states can regulate the administration of their laws including allocating the burden of pursuasion so long as
the state law does not "'[offend] some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2577 (1992) (quoting Patterson, 432
U.S. at 201-02).
243. New Jersey has a statute that utilizes both the subjective and the objective approaches of the entrapment
defense. N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:2-12 (West 1982). See also New Jersey v. Rockholt, 476 A.2d 1236, 1241 (N.J.
1984) (interpreting statute to require dual standards).
244. This propensity is nothing more than the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime.
The Seventh Circuit laid down some factors relevant to the inquiry of predisposition. Those factors are:
(1) assessing the character or reputation of the defendant, including any prior criminal record; (2)
whether the suggestion of criminal activity was made by the government; (3) whether the defendant was
engaged in criminal activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant expressed reluctance to commit the offense which was overcome only by repeated government inducement or persuasion; and (5) the nature of
the inducement or persuasion applied by the government.
United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d
1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983)).
245. Id.
246. It has been over seventy-five years since the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its opinion in
Woo Wai v. United States, the first decision which recognized the entrapment defense. Woo Wai v. United States,
223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
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The adoption of such a two-part standard would allow the Court to re-assess
entrapment as a total defense. This two-part analysis mirrors the analysis used in
homicide cases when the rule of provocation defense is offered. In those cases the
Court reasons that if the assailant was acting under such extreme heat of passion
that he could no longer act as a free moral agent and if a reasonable person would
have acted out of passion rather than reason, then the defendant will not be
convicted of murder but will be guilty of manslaughter.247 If the Court is to treat
the entrapment defense like mens rea defenses, such as the rule of provocation,
then the Court must consider the defendant's criminal intent and allow him to be
punished accordingly.
If government officials implant criminal intent into the defendant's mind and
entice him into committing a crime, the defendant cannot claim that he had no
mens rea or that he was totally without freedom of choice. His having committed
the crime is evidence that he had some evil intent, and although police persuasion
may have been extreme, he could have chosen to abstain from the criminal activity. 2" By considering entrapment to be a complete defense, the courts do not punish the defendant for acting on his intent. In doing so, the Court ignores this
criminal intent and the defendant's freedom of choice.
This choice is what distinguishes the entrapment defense from other complete
defenses such as necessity or coercion. A starving man without any other means
must steal to survive. When faced with the choice between stealing food and
death, such a man is faced with no choice. The necessity defense completely absolves this man of culpability.249 Similarly, a woman forced at gun point to drive a
fleeing felon to safety has no choice but to comply, nonetheless she is an accomplice. Since her compliance was coerced, however, she has no criminal responsi25 0
bility.
In order to bring the entrapment defense in line with other mens rea defenses defenses that seek to punish only those with the requisite criminal intent - entrapment should not serve to excuse the defendant from all criminal responsibility. A
finding of entrapment should, however, serve to mitigate the amount of criminal
culpability the defendant should bear. If investigation techniques were employed
that would have persuaded a reasonable person to commit the crime and those
techniques caused the otherwise innocent defendant to commit the crime, then the
crime for which the defendant is charged should be mitigated proportionally to reflect his reduced mens rea. A total excuse for his crime cannot be justified.

247. See William H. Coldiron, HistoricalDevelopment of Manslaughter,38 Ky. L.J. 527 (1949-50).
248. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor pointed out that Jacobson was never approached or solicited by a government agent face to face and
suggests that the letters and brochures could easily have been ignored or thrown away. Id.
249. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(a) (2d ed. 1986).

250. Id. § 5.3(a).
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IV. CONCLUSION

The failure of the Court in Sorrells 251 to state decisively the purpose of the entrapment defense fueled the fire which had been raging in the lower courts over
which theory of entrapment should be adopted. Since Sorrells,5 2 the Court has
rendered five opinions 25 3 on the issue of entrapment and each time has affirmed
the use of the subjective entrapment theory. Each time, however, the Court has
failed to put an end to the controversy by unequivocally stating the purpose of the
entrapment defense. If the Court had said that its purpose is to punish the overzealous activities of law enforcement, the lower courts and legal commentators would
have no choice but to follow the objective approach which most effectively reaches
that end. Alternatively, if the Court had held that the purpose of entrapment is to
protect the innocent who would otherwise not have committed a crime, then lower
courts and legal theorists would undoubtedly support the subjective approach to
the defense. It is this failure to identify the purpose for the entrapment defense that
has created such polarity within the legal community which only the Court can
bring to an end.
The Supreme Court was given an opportunity in Jacobsonv. United States25 4 to
put the controversy surrounding the entrapment defense to rest. Although the
Court in Jacobson took great strides in solidifying the use of the subjective approach to the entrapment defense in our criminal jurisprudence, the Court again
failed to offer any validity for their decision to support the subjective approach to
the absolute exclusion of any objective considerations.
An approach to the entrapment defense that appears to be preferable to either
the subjective or objective theory is one that more accurately reflects the varied
considerations contemplated when determining the availability of the entrapment
defense. Such an approach would involve a two-step analysis255 combining both
objective as well as subjective considerations. Further in order to maintain consistency with the criminal law, entrapment should not constitute a complete defense but should serve only to mitigate the defendant's responsibility for the crime.
This approach does more than accomplish the objectives proffered by one camp of
entrapment theorists at the expense of the other; it simultaneously fosters the goals
of each while remaining in accord with basic criminal law principles.

251. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
252. Id.
253. See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988);
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
254. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
255. See supra part V.F.

